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RESOLVING THE FRYE DILEMMA-A 
RELIABILITY APPROACH 
Fredric I. Lederer* 
PROPOSAL 
The purpose of this compilation of proposed rules is, of course, to resolve what 
might reasonably be termed the Frye' dilemma-how should courts determine 
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Most commentators have recog-
nized2 that Frye's "general acceptance" test suffers from numerous deficien-
cies, 3 not the least of which is the peculiar fact that it is unclear whether Frye 
survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its various state 
analogs.' 
The primary alternative to Frye has been the relevance approach.s I pro-
pose a different alternative, a reliability approach that is between the relevance 
*Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williams-
burg, VA 23185 . 
1Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
2See, e.g. , Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984). Symposium on Science and Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 188 
( 1983); Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of a 
Scientific Principle or Technique-Application of the Frye Test, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 51 (1983). 
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879 
(1982); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV . 1197 (1980). See also 3 J . WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN 'S EVIDENCE, 702[03) (1985) . 
3See, e.g. , Symposium on Science and Rules of Evidence , 99 F.R.D. 188, 191-93 (1983). In-
terestingly, the three working groups formed as part of the 1983 Symposium unanimously agreed 
on the need to abandon Frye. /d. at 229-33 . 
4 See, e.g., 3 J . WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ,, 702[03); 702[06) 
(1985). 
SM. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1986) . See 
also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN 'S EVIDENCE, 702[03) (1985) . 
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test and the Frye rule. Specifically, I propose that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
be amended to provide: 
If reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 6 
COMMENTARY 
The proposed rule, which is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ex-
cept for the addition of' 'reliable,'' is taken verbatim from Proposed Virginia 
Rule of Evidence 702 which is now undergoing review by the Supreme Court 
of Virginia. 7 As noted in the drafter's Comment to the Proposed Virginia Rule: 
The word "reliable" represents a more flexible and receptive attitude toward scientific 
and expert evidence than is indicated in some decisions in other jurisdictions that quote 
particular language from Frye v. United States, ... and that insist that any approach 
labeled "novel" must be generally accepted in a designated field before it may be uti-
lized by an expert. Rule 702 is not a bar to all techniques of recent origin. But the rule 
does require the trial judge to determine that a scientific or expert technique is reliable 
enough for use by courts and that triers of fact can appreciate the degree of reliability 
associated with a technique. 
Although perhaps overly simplistic, it might reasonably be said that the 
primary criticisms of Frye are that the doctrine is unclear and hard to apply, and 
that to the extent that there is agreement on its meaning, Frye tends to be unduly 
conservative in its effect on the admissibility of novel evidence. Adherents of 
Frye, on the other hand, usually applaud its conservative nature urging that 
what may occasionally be a vice is actually a virtue-especially in criminal 
cases where the questioned evidence is customarily offered by the prosecu-
tion.8 What all commentators appear to agree on is that scientific evidence, 
novel or not, ought to be reliable. 9 It is how we are to reach that goal that is the 
crux of the present exercise. 
6Proposed Virginia Rule of Evidence 702, Article VII, Opinions and Expert Testimony, Ap-
proved Committee Draft (November 10, 1984) (emphasis added). 
7 A broad based committee appointed by the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court for-
warded proposed rules of evidence to the Chief Justice in 1985. The rules, which are presently 
under consideration by the Supreme Court of Virginia, require legislative enactment. Professor 
Stephen Saltzburg of the University of Virginia served as Reporter for the drafting committee for 
the rules and was the author of Proposed Virginia Rule of Evidence 702. 
8See, e.g., Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A 
Half-Century Inter, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1243-45 (1980). 
9See, e.g., Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of Evi-
dence of a Scientific Principle or Technique-Application of the Frye Test, 19 CRJM. L. BuLL. 51, 
52-53 (1983); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibiliity, 67 
IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 
, 702[03) (1985). Despite this recognition, few courts have utilized an express reliability analysis. 
But see, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985); State v. Kers-
ting, 500r. App. 461,623 P.2d 1095 (1981), aff'd, 292 Or. 350,638 P.2d 1145 (1982). Compare 
State v. Kersting, supra with State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984). 
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The relevance approach requires that the proffered evidence satisfy the rel-
evance requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which necessarily re-
quires an evaluation of the evidence's probative worth. 10 Theoretically, once 
the evidence has been established to have probative value, it is relevant and 
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, unless it fails to satisfy Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702's requirement that the evidence "will assist the trier of 
fact." Unless this language is to be viewed as providing a general reliability 
requirement, relevant evidence usually will be admissible subject only to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403 's exclusion of relevant evidence when its ''probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . . '' This test is conducive to admission 
of novel scientific evidence. However, it presents a significant theoretical risk 
that unreliable evidence could be admitted because of the meager demands of 
logical relevancy. 
The Frye "general acceptance" test is often viewed as a guarantee of reli-
ability inasmuch as Frye requires, at least in its original formulation, "general 
acceptance in the particular [scientific] field in which it belongs. " 11 Although 
this doctrine has the questionable ''virtue'' of being subject to judicial ascer-
tainment without substantial scientific inquiry 12 it guarantees not "reliability" 
but only that the evidence is in accord with the scientific wisdom of the mo-
ment. 13 The Frye test, then, may accomplish its task of providing some measure 
of reliability, but may do so at great evidentiary cost and without substantial 
judicial support. 
What is needed is a reliability requirement more demanding than mere log-
ical relevancy but easier of application than Frye. Proposed Virginia Rule of 
Evidence 702 provides one such attempt. 
The proposed rule echoes aspects of the conservative approach often ap-
plauded in Frye. It requires not just that the evidence be logically relevant but 
also that the evidence be found by the trial judge to be "reliable" (implicitly) 
for the specific purpose offered. The burden is on the proponent. The evidence 
must not only be reliable, but also must' 'assist the trier of fact'' under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702. If the proposed amendment were accepted, it is likely 
10 A number of different formulations have been offered to assist courts in evaluation of proba-
tive value. See, e.g, McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 
67 IowA L. REv. 879, 911-12 (1982); Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific 
Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
261 (1981). 
11 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
12Because the court in Frye contemplated that evidence which was supported by general accep-
tance in the appropriate scientific community would be reliable, it is unlikely that it contemplated a 
substantial inquiry into the validity of generally accepted scientific theory of procedure. 
1311 may be that this should be sufficient for admissibility at trial because admission is not dis-
positive; the adversary system may ensure that the fact finder will be exposed to any questions of 
weight. On the other hand, as Professor Giannelli has pointed out in Symposium on Science and 
Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 188,206-07 (1983), even if witnesses are available for both parties, 
there may be a scientific "information gap.'' What is generally accepted may not in fact reflect the 
latest, the most accurate, scientific understanding. 
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that the ''assistance'' aspectof702 would no longer be used as a substitute for a 
reliability analysis .14 Either the ''assistance'' portion of Rule 702 or Rule 403 
would provide a protection against reliable evidence that should be excluded 
for other reasons. 
A candid analysis of the proposed rule makes it clear that the rule is not a 
panacea. It mandates that the trial judge will determine reliability but does not 
define the standard to be used, inherently vesting broad discretion in the trial 
judge. It necessarily requires the judge to make a scientific determination: from 
the foundation presented is the evidence sufficiently reliable to be admitted? 
The lack of scientific background in the trial bench and bar has been properly 
criticized. 15 The proposed rule arguably forces one to come head to head with 
that deficiency: with such a lack of scientific knowledge, how well can one 
expect a reliability standard to work? I can see, however, little or no difference 
between the judge's duties under this approach and those under the relevancy 
one. Under either, the trial judge must determine the probative value of the 
proffered evidence, 16 and the same questions that must be addressed in a rele-
vance analysis should be resolved in a reliability examination. Evidence that is 
unreliable is logically inadmissible. At most, one might argue that the standard 
in the proposed amendment of Rule 702 is more demanding than the relevancy 
requirement. That may be so, but it is unclear whether the difference is qualita-
tive rather than quantitative. 17 
The proposed rule does have the virtue of requiring the proponent to estab-
lish more than either logical relevance or mere "general acceptance." In the-
ory, the rule risks further complication oflitigation involving experts inasmuch 
as it applies not just to novel scientific evidence but to all expert testimony of-
fered under Rule 702. Although it may be that some form of restriction to novel 
scientific evidence is both possible and desirable, such a restriction may be un-
necessary. Those procedures that are in fact generally accepted are not likely to 
be challenged, 18 and the reliability of some customary procedures and tech-
niques may be subject to judicial notice in any event. 
14ln such a case, Rule 702's "assistance" requirement could be used to exclude evidence that 
would be within the knowledge of the jury and not of particular assistance to them. 
15See, e.g. , Symposium on Science and the Rule of Legal Procedure , 101 F.R.D. 599, 603- 04 
(1984) (remarks of Chief Judge Howar~ T. Markey). 
16But see Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary 
Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 577 (1984) 
(concluding that in the absence of Frye and further amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 
901 (b)(9) would result in jury determination of the validity of scientific theory or process) . 
17 A cynic might suggest, however, that pragmatic limits on the presentation of expert testi-
mony will result in little or no difference regardless of the legal standard applied. If the courts are 
limited to one or two uncontroverted government witnesses in criminal cases, for example, there 
may be little difference between Frye or a reliability standard. Absent some reason to believe that 
further inquiry might be needed, a judge is unlikely to consider appointing a court expert. 
18See, e.g, Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of Evi-
dence of a Scientific Principle or Technique-Application of the Frye Test, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 
52 (1983). 
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It must be conceded that the proposed rule does nothing to resolve the nu-
merous pragmatic difficulties faced in the day-to-day handling of expert testi-
mony. Accordingly, the proposed amendment should not be viewed as an en-
tity in and of itself. Many of the procedural suggestions made by others merit 
adoption notwithstanding the admissibility standard that is adopted. Professor 
Giannelli's notice provision (which appears in this set of proposed rules), in-
creased use of tailored jury instructions dealing with expert testimony, and 
greater use of court appointed experts, would, for example, be valuable. 
One may reasonably ask whether adding a reliability requirement to Rule 
702 is actually necessary. With one caveat, the answer depends in large part on 
how judges actually handle admission of scientific and expert evidence. If the 
judge determines carefully the probative value of evidence using the techniques 
espoused by a number of commentators and judges and then uses the evaluation 
in a determination of logical relevancy, a determination of whether the evi-
dence "will assist the trier of fact," or a determination of whether the evidence 
should be excluded under Rule 403, there may well be no difference in prag-
matic result whatsoever. The proposed rule does, however, mandate that the 
judge make a probative value determination and that the determination exceed 
the minimum requirement of logical relevancy. 
The proposed rule does have one additional advantage. As previously 
noted, there has been great debate as to whether Frye survived the adoption of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 19 Amendment of Rule 702 would finally put that 
issue to rest and leave us with a single standard. Thus, the caveat referred to 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether adoption of such a standard with its own inherent questions is the 
best approach is, of course, the question and the reason for the inclusion of the 
position in this collection of approaches. Some resolution of the present uncer-
tainty strikes me as highly desirable, and the reliability approach seems, on 
balance, to be a useful method of improving on our present difficulties. 
19See note 4 supra. 
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